{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T04:19:26Z","timestamp":1760242766648,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":18,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2016,5,12]],"date-time":"2016-05-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1463011200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"name":"Spanish Ministry of Education","award":["ECO2012-34046"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["ECO2012-34046"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium in which her group-mates make the same proposal as the members of the other group. Thus, in heterogeneous groups the presence of more patient members may reduce the utility of its members.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g7020012","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2016,5,12]],"date-time":"2016-05-12T10:18:45Z","timestamp":1463048325000},"page":"12","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"7","author":[{"given":"Daniel","family":"Cardona","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Departament d\u2019Economia Aplicada, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Campus UIB, 07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-5478-554X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Antoni","family":"Rub\u00ed-Barcel\u00f3","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Departament d\u2019Economia Aplicada, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Campus UIB, 07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2016,5,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"399","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-015-0895-2","article-title":"Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: Delegation versus ratification","volume":"45","author":"Cardona","year":"2015","journal-title":"Soc. 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