{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T04:13:27Z","timestamp":1760242407107,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":17,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2017,7,14]],"date-time":"2017-07-14T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1499990400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question whether anticipated verbal communication can be effective in increasing offers. We implement a between-subjects experimental design in the ultimatum game with strategy method manipulating the form of anticipated verbal communication (no communication, one-sided communication from proposers and two-sided communication) and find that offers are significantly higher in the presence of anticipated two-sided communication. However, anticipated one-sided communication from proposers has no effect on offers, suggesting, as found in previous studies, that it is the anticipation of feedback that is relevant.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g8030029","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2017,7,14]],"date-time":"2017-07-14T10:45:02Z","timestamp":1500029102000},"page":"29","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Anticipated Communication in the Ultimatum Game"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"8","author":[{"given":"Mario","family":"Capizzani","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"IESE Business School, Av. Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spain"}]},{"given":"Luigi","family":"Mittone","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Via Inama 5, 38122 Trento, Italy"}]},{"given":"Andrew","family":"Musau","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Via Inama 5, 38122 Trento, Italy"},{"name":"Faculty of Economics and Organizational Sciences, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Industrigata 17, 2619, Lillehammer, Norway"}]},{"given":"Antonino","family":"Vaccaro","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"IESE Business School, Av. Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spain"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,7,14]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"393","DOI":"10.1016\/j.joep.2008.12.002","article-title":"Avoiding the sharp tongue: Anticipated written messages promote fair economic exchange","volume":"30","author":"Xiao","year":"2009","journal-title":"J. Econ. Psychol."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"100","DOI":"10.1016\/j.evolhumbehav.2007.11.001","article-title":"Anticipated verbal feedback induces altrusitic behavior","volume":"29","author":"Ellingsen","year":"2007","journal-title":"Evol. Hum. Behav."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"45","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econlet.2016.04.033","article-title":"The anticipatory effect of nonverbal communication","volume":"144","author":"Brook","year":"2016","journal-title":"Econ. 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