{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T04:13:34Z","timestamp":1760242414977,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":23,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2017,8,8]],"date-time":"2017-08-08T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1502150400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001659","name":"Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["TU 409\/1-1"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["TU 409\/1-1"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001659","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We present experimental results on the role of beliefs in the cognitive ability of others in a problem involving backward induction. Using a modified version of the so-called race game, our design allows the effects of a player\u2019s own inability to perform backward induction to be separated from the effects of her disbelief in the ability of others to do so. We find that behavior is responsive to the dependence on others who might fail in backward induction as well as information regarding their backward induction skills.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g8030033","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2017,8,8]],"date-time":"2017-08-08T10:28:08Z","timestamp":1502188088000},"page":"33","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["A Note on Disbelief in Others regarding Backward Induction"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"8","author":[{"given":"Andreas","family":"Tuti\u0107","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Sociology, Leipzig University, 04107 Leipzig, Germany"},{"name":"Institute of Sociology, University of Bern, 3012 Bern, Switzerland"}]},{"given":"Sascha","family":"Grehl","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Sociology, Leipzig University, 04107 Leipzig, Germany"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,8,8]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"92","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(81)90018-1","article-title":"Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox","volume":"25","author":"Rosenthal","year":"1981","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"803","DOI":"10.2307\/2951567","article-title":"An experimental study of the centipede game","volume":"60","author":"McKelvey","year":"1992","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_3","first-page":"1313","article-title":"Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study","volume":"85","author":"Nagel","year":"1995","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"269","DOI":"10.1007\/BF02425258","article-title":"An experimental study of Constant-Sum centipede games","volume":"25","author":"Fey","year":"1996","journal-title":"Int. J. Game Theory"},{"key":"ref_5","first-page":"947","article-title":"Iterated dominance and iterated best response in experimental \u201cp-beauty contests\u201d","volume":"88","author":"Ho","year":"1998","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"356","DOI":"10.1006\/jmps.1998.1225","article-title":"Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: An investigation on learning","volume":"42","author":"Nagel","year":"1998","journal-title":"J. Math. Psychol."},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1687","DOI":"10.1257\/000282802762024737","article-title":"One, two, (three), infinity, ... newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments","volume":"92","author":"Montalvo","year":"2002","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2009.05.015","article-title":"Higher cognitive ability is associated with lower entries in a p-beauty contest","volume":"72","author":"Burnham","year":"2009","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"ref_9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1619","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.99.4.1619","article-title":"Field centipedes","volume":"99","author":"Volij","year":"2009","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"975","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.101.2.975","article-title":"Checkmate: Exploring backward induction among chess players","volume":"101","author":"Levitt","year":"2011","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"146","DOI":"10.1007\/s40881-015-0003-5","article-title":"Naive play and the process of choice in guessing games","volume":"1","author":"Agranov","year":"2015","journal-title":"J. Econ. Sci. Assoc."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"5","DOI":"10.1257\/jel.51.1.5","article-title":"Structural models of nonequilibrium strategic thinking: Theory, evidence, and applications","volume":"51","author":"Crawford","year":"2013","journal-title":"J. Econ. Lit."},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"159","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-008-9206-4","article-title":"The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person \u201cGuessing\u201d game","volume":"12","author":"Chou","year":"2009","journal-title":"Exp. Econ."},{"key":"ref_14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"364","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2007.05.007","article-title":"Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation","volume":"62","author":"Devetag","year":"2008","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Dasgupta, P., Gale, D., Hart, O., and Maskin, E. (1992). Irrationality in game theory. Economic Analysis of Markets and Games, MIT Press.","DOI":"10.7551\/mitpress\/2581.001.0001"},{"key":"ref_16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"363","DOI":"10.1086\/psaprocbienmeetp.1988.2.192897","article-title":"Common knowledge and games with perfect information","volume":"Volume 2","author":"Reny","year":"1988","journal-title":"Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association"},{"key":"ref_17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"369","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2015.07.012","article-title":"On the persistence of strategic sophistication","volume":"159","author":"Georganas","year":"2015","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1413","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA7405","article-title":"What happens in the field stays in the field: Exploring whether professionals play minimax in laboratory experiments","volume":"78","author":"Levitt","year":"2010","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"144","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2010.04.005","article-title":"Experience and insight in the race game","volume":"75","author":"Gneezy","year":"2010","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"ref_20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"132","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2010.03.025","article-title":"Epiphany in the game of 21","volume":"75","author":"Dufwenberg","year":"2010","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"ref_21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"286","DOI":"10.1016\/j.euroecorev.2014.12.003","article-title":"Exploring the capability to reason backwards: An experimental study with children, adolescents, and young adults","volume":"74","author":"Heinrich","year":"2015","journal-title":"Eur. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"117","DOI":"10.1016\/j.euroecorev.2014.07.003","article-title":"hroot: Hamburg Recruitment and Organization Online Tool","volume":"71","author":"Bock","year":"2014","journal-title":"Eur. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-006-9159-4","article-title":"z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments","volume":"10","author":"Fischbacher","year":"2007","journal-title":"Exp. Econ."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/8\/3\/33\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T18:41:47Z","timestamp":1760208107000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/8\/3\/33"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2017,8,8]]},"references-count":23,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,9]]}},"alternative-id":["g8030033"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g8030033","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"2073-4336"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2017,8,8]]}}}