{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T04:13:46Z","timestamp":1760242426091,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":21,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2017,8,14]],"date-time":"2017-08-14T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1502668800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>The communication of participants to identify an acceptable bargaining outcome in the Nash bargaining game is all about fairness norms. Participants introduce fairness norms which yield a better outcome for themselves in order to convince the other participant of their bargaining proposal. Typically, these fairness norms are in line with theoretical predictions, which support a wide variety of different but fair outcomes the participants can choose from. In this experiment, we play two treatments of the Nash bargaining game: in one treatment, the participants play a dictator game prior to bargaining, and in the other treatment they do not. We find that participants who have not played the dictator game intensively discuss the outcome of the game and come to solutions closer to the equal split of the pie the longer they chat. This effect vanishes as soon as the participants have previous experience from a dictator game: instead of chatting, they establish the fairness norm introduced in the dictator game. Remarkably, if the dictator is unfair in the dictator game, he also gets a higher share of the pie in the Nash bargaining game.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g8030034","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2017,8,14]],"date-time":"2017-08-14T10:23:12Z","timestamp":1502706192000},"page":"34","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["The Impact of Previous Action on Bargaining\u2014An Experiment on the Emergence of Preferences for Fairness Norms"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"8","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9443-4648","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Thomas","family":"Neumann","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Otto-von-Guericke University of Magdeburg, 39106 Magdeburg, Germany"}]},{"given":"Stephan","family":"Schosser","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Otto-von-Guericke University of Magdeburg, 39106 Magdeburg, Germany"}]},{"given":"Bodo","family":"Vogt","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Otto-von-Guericke University of Magdeburg, 39106 Magdeburg, Germany"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,8,14]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","unstructured":"Tsiropoulou, E., Kapoukakis, A., and Papavassiliou, S. (2013, January 22\u201324). Energy-efficient subcarrier allocation in SC-FDMA wireless networks based on multilateral model of bargaining. Proceedings of the IFIP Networking Conference, Brooklyn, NY, USA."},{"key":"ref_2","first-page":"1","article-title":"A Non-Cooperative Approach to the Joint Subcarrier and Power Allocation Problem in Multi-Service SCFDMA Networks","volume":"16","author":"Tsiropoulou","year":"2016","journal-title":"EAI Endorsed Trans. Mob. Commun. Appl."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1007\/s12110-002-1012-7","article-title":"Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms","volume":"13","author":"Fehr","year":"2002","journal-title":"Hum. Nat."},{"key":"ref_4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"581","DOI":"10.1016\/j.euroecorev.2004.10.005","article-title":"Social Status and Group Norms: Indirect Reciprocity in a Helping Experiment","volume":"50","author":"Seinen","year":"2006","journal-title":"Eur. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"183","DOI":"10.1007\/s11846-008-0021-2","article-title":"Not just hot air: Normative codes of conduct induce cooperative behavior","volume":"2","author":"Lauer","year":"2008","journal-title":"Rev. Manag. Sci."},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"324","DOI":"10.1086\/209891","article-title":"When social norms overpower competition: Gift exchange in experimental labor markets","volume":"16","author":"Fehr","year":"1998","journal-title":"J. Labor Econ."},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"185","DOI":"10.1016\/j.tics.2004.02.007","article-title":"Social norms and human cooperation","volume":"8","author":"Fehr","year":"2004","journal-title":"Trends Cogn. Sci."},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"495","DOI":"10.1111\/jeea.12006","article-title":"Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?","volume":"11","author":"Krupka","year":"2013","journal-title":"J. Eur. Econ. Assoc."},{"key":"ref_9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"155","DOI":"10.2307\/1907266","article-title":"The bargaining problem","volume":"18","author":"Nash","year":"1950","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"329","DOI":"10.1016\/0167-2681(94)00071-L","article-title":"On ultimatum bargaining experiments\u2014A personal review","volume":"27","year":"1995","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"560","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-013-9352-1","article-title":"How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?","volume":"16","author":"Anbarci","year":"2013","journal-title":"Exp. Econ."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"97","DOI":"10.2307\/1912531","article-title":"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model","volume":"50","author":"Rubinstein","year":"1982","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"21","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01175872","article-title":"The impact of fairness on bargaining behavior","volume":"19","author":"Burrows","year":"1994","journal-title":"Empir. Econ."},{"key":"ref_14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"261","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2014.10.009","article-title":"Bargaining power does not matter when sharing losses\u2014Experimental evidence of equal split in the Nash bargaining game","volume":"108","author":"Kroll","year":"2014","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"ref_15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"166","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.90.1.166","article-title":"ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition","volume":"90","author":"Bolton","year":"2000","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"817","DOI":"10.1162\/003355399556151","article-title":"A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation","volume":"114","author":"Fehr","year":"1999","journal-title":"Q. J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"857","DOI":"10.1257\/0002828042002741","article-title":"Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments","volume":"94","author":"Engelmann","year":"2004","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"117","DOI":"10.1016\/j.euroecorev.2014.07.003","article-title":"Hroot: Hamburg registration and organization online tool; WiSo-HH Working Paper Series No. 1","volume":"71","author":"Bock","year":"2012","journal-title":"Eur. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-006-9159-4","article-title":"z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments","volume":"10","author":"Fischbacher","year":"2007","journal-title":"Exp. Econ."},{"key":"ref_20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"122","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1995.1027","article-title":"Trust, reciprocity, and social history","volume":"10","author":"Berg","year":"1995","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"137","DOI":"10.1257\/jep.14.3.137","article-title":"Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms","volume":"4","author":"Ostrom","year":"2000","journal-title":"J. Econ. Perspect."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/8\/3\/34\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T18:42:15Z","timestamp":1760208135000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/8\/3\/34"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2017,8,14]]},"references-count":21,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,9]]}},"alternative-id":["g8030034"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g8030034","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"2073-4336"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2017,8,14]]}}}