{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,12,2]],"date-time":"2025-12-02T06:13:14Z","timestamp":1764655994343,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":34,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2017,9,5]],"date-time":"2017-09-05T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1504569600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically, I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic incentives decreases with the degrees of morality and altruism displayed by the agents, thus leading to increased profits for the principal. I also show that a team of moral agents will only be preferred if the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to efforts; the probability of a high realization of output conditional on both agents exerting effort is sufficiently high; and either the outside option for the agents is zero or the degree of morality is sufficiently low.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g8030037","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2017,9,5]],"date-time":"2017-09-05T11:26:19Z","timestamp":1504610779000},"page":"37","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":7,"title":["Team Incentives under Moral and Altruistic Preferences: Which Team to Choose?"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"8","author":[{"given":"Roberto","family":"Sarkisian","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Toulouse School of Economics, 21 Allee de Brienne, MF 003, Toulouse 31000, France"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,9,5]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","unstructured":"O\u2019Leonard, K., Erickson, R., and Krider, J. 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