{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T19:12:22Z","timestamp":1760209942660,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":56,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2017,11,17]],"date-time":"2017-11-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1510876800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100000781","name":"European Research Council","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["Advanced Investigator MOMENTUM 324247"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["Advanced Investigator MOMENTUM 324247"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100000781","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Many real-world mechanisms are \u201cnoisy\u201d or \u201cfuzzy\u201d, that is the institutions in place to implement them operate with non-negligible degrees of imprecision and error. This observation raises the more general question of whether mechanisms that work in theory are also robust to more realistic assumptions such as noise. In this paper, in the context of voluntary contribution games, we focus on a mechanism known as \u201ccontribution-based competitive grouping\u201d. First, we analyze how the mechanism works under noise and what happens when other assumptions such as population homogeneity are relaxed. Second, we investigate the welfare properties of the mechanism, interpreting noise as a policy instrument, and we use logit dynamic simulations to formulate mechanism design recommendations.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g8040050","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2017,11,17]],"date-time":"2017-11-17T12:00:20Z","timestamp":1510920020000},"page":"50","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Contribution-Based Grouping under Noise"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"8","author":[{"given":"Heinrich","family":"Nax","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Computational Social Science, ETH Z\u00fcrich, 8092 Z\u00fcrich, Switzerland"}]},{"given":"Ryan","family":"Murphy","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Zurich, 8006 Z\u00fcrich, Switzerland"},{"name":"Morningstar Inc., Behavioral Science Group,  Chicago, IL 60602, USA"}]},{"given":"Stefano","family":"Duca","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Computational Social Science, ETH Z\u00fcrich, 8092 Z\u00fcrich, Switzerland"}]},{"given":"Dirk","family":"Helbing","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Computational Social Science, ETH Z\u00fcrich, 8092 Z\u00fcrich, Switzerland"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,11,17]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","first-page":"1041","article-title":"Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring","volume":"58","author":"Abreu","year":"1990","journal-title":"Econom. 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