{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T20:10:36Z","timestamp":1760299836410,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":30,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,3,12]],"date-time":"2018-03-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1520812800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially bid for three goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for the good and exit the auction once they have obtained one good. We show that, contrary to equilibrium predictions, subjects\u2019 bidding behavior is excessively similar across units and across mechanisms at the aggregate level. We provide two (complementary) explanations for these departures. One is bounded rationality. Subjects do not fully comprehend subtle differences between mechanisms. The other is self-selection. Subjects are very heterogeneous and some of them deviate more from equilibrium than others. Since deviations take mostly the form of overbidding, these subjects win the first or second good and exit the auction, leaving those who play closer to theoretical predictions to bid for the third good. Support for this hypothesis comes from the documented higher bidding, lower efficiency and lower profits associated with the first and second unit compared to the third one.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g9010015","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,3,12]],"date-time":"2018-03-12T13:13:48Z","timestamp":1520860428000},"page":"15","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: An Experimental Investigation"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"9","author":[{"given":"F.","family":"Otamendi","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Departamento de Econom\u00eda Aplicada I, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Paseo Artilleros s\/n, 28032 Madrid, Spain"}]},{"given":"Isabelle","family":"Brocas","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Southern California, 3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300 Los Angeles, CA 90089-0253, USA"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8616-1259","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Juan","family":"Carrillo","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, University of Southern California, 3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300 Los Angeles, CA 90089-0253, USA"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,3,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","first-page":"5636","article-title":"Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research","volume":"Volume 2","author":"Kagel","year":"2015","journal-title":"The Handbook of Experimental Economics"},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"461","DOI":"10.1111\/joes.12017","article-title":"Multiunit auctions","volume":"277","author":"Kwasnica","year":"2013","journal-title":"J. Econ. Surv."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"23","DOI":"10.1257\/jep.3.3.23","article-title":"How auctions work for wine and art","volume":"33","author":"Ashenfelter","year":"1989","journal-title":"J. Econ. Perspect."},{"key":"ref_4","first-page":"501","article-title":"Testing for price anomalies in real-estate auctions","volume":"822","author":"Ashenfelter","year":"1992","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1055","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.91.4.1055","article-title":"The declining price anomaly in Dutch rose auctions","volume":"91","author":"Pradhan","year":"2001","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_6","unstructured":"Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Shubik, M., and Stark, R. (1983). Multiple-object auctions. Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting, UP."},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"191","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1993.1041","article-title":"The declining price anomaly","volume":"60","author":"McAfee","year":"1993","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_8","unstructured":"Ginsburgh, V.A., and Menger, P.M. (1996). Experimental examination of the declining-price anomaly. Economics of the Art: Selected Essays, Elsevier."},{"key":"ref_9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"47","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-006-0147-x","article-title":"Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: Theory and behavior","volume":"34","author":"Salmon","year":"2008","journal-title":"Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"55","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2005.03.011","article-title":"Bidding behavior at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: A laboratory analysis","volume":"63","author":"Neugebauer","year":"2007","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"50","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2006.03.011","article-title":"Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: An experimental study","volume":"58","author":"Brosig","year":"2007","journal-title":"Game Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Dixit, A.K., and Pindyck, R.S. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press.","DOI":"10.1515\/9781400830176"},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"64","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econlet.2007.02.022","article-title":"Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions","volume":"97","author":"Leufkens","year":"2007","journal-title":"Econ. Lett."},{"key":"ref_14","first-page":"2","article-title":"An experimental comparison of sequential first- and -price auctions with synergies","volume":"12","author":"Leufkens","year":"2012","journal-title":"BE J. Theor. Econ."},{"key":"ref_15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Kagel, J.H., and Roth, A.E. (1995). Auctions: A survey of experimental research. The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.","DOI":"10.1515\/9780691213255"},{"key":"ref_16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1278","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.97.4.1278","article-title":"Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments","volume":"97","author":"Casari","year":"2007","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"171","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-006-9159-4","article-title":"z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments","volume":"10","author":"Fischbacher","year":"2007","journal-title":"Exp. Econ."},{"key":"ref_18","first-page":"1","article-title":"Theory and behavior of single object auctions","volume":"Volume 2","author":"Smith","year":"1982","journal-title":"Research in Experimental Economics"},{"key":"ref_19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"139","DOI":"10.1016\/0167-2681(85)90014-9","article-title":"Information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions","volume":"6","author":"Isaac","year":"1985","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"ref_20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"155","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2004.04.002","article-title":"Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions","volume":"51","author":"Ockenfels","year":"2005","journal-title":"Game Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"190","DOI":"10.1007\/s10683-007-9166-0","article-title":"Bidding as if risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback","volume":"11","author":"Neugebauer","year":"2007","journal-title":"Exp. Econ."},{"key":"ref_22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"123","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1025375803912","article-title":"Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries","volume":"6","author":"Dorsey","year":"2003","journal-title":"Exp. Econ."},{"key":"ref_23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"183","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2005.10.001","article-title":"Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets","volume":"54","author":"Neugebauer","year":"2006","journal-title":"Game Econ. Behav."},{"key":"ref_24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"421","DOI":"10.1007\/s11238-013-9378-z","article-title":"Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: Experimental evidence for the one-shot game","volume":"75","author":"Neugebauer","year":"2013","journal-title":"Theor. Decis."},{"key":"ref_25","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"413","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00197","article-title":"Behavior in multi-unit demand auctions: Experiments with uniform price and dynamic Vickrey auctions","volume":"69","author":"Kagel","year":"2001","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"ref_26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"75","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jebo.2008.09.006","article-title":"Impact of valuation ranking information on bidding in first-price auctions: A laboratory study","volume":"69","author":"Elbittar","year":"2009","journal-title":"J. Econ. Behav. Organ."},{"key":"ref_27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"868","DOI":"10.2307\/2234706","article-title":"Independent private value auctions-bidder behavior in 1st-price, 2nd-price and 3rd-price auctions with varying numbers of bidders","volume":"103","author":"Kagel","year":"1993","journal-title":"Econ. J."},{"key":"ref_28","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"247","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.2001.2914","article-title":"Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions","volume":"104","author":"Goeree","year":"2002","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"ref_29","first-page":"1","article-title":"Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study","volume":"49","author":"Wolfstetter","year":"2005","journal-title":"Eur. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"ref_30","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1407","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.97.4.1407","article-title":"Auctions with anticipated regret: Theory and experiment","volume":"97","author":"Ozbay","year":"2007","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/9\/1\/15\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T14:56:45Z","timestamp":1760194605000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/9\/1\/15"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2018,3,12]]},"references-count":30,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,3]]}},"alternative-id":["g9010015"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g9010015","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"2073-4336"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2018,3,12]]}}}