{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,28]],"date-time":"2026-02-28T04:27:00Z","timestamp":1772252820750,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":33,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,9,5]],"date-time":"2018-09-05T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1536105600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>This paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes coordination game. There is a close connection between the extent of information revelation and the possibility of coordination failure; while, in the absence of any coordination failure, there exist equilibria with full disclosure, in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium with no information revelation. We provide a purification argument for the non-existence result, as well demonstrate that it is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g9030064","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,9,5]],"date-time":"2018-09-05T03:08:55Z","timestamp":1536116935000},"page":"64","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Coordination and Private Information Revelation"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"9","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-6403-4192","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Debdatta","family":"Saha","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Economics, South Asian University, Akbar Bhawan, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi 110021, India"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Prabal","family":"Roy Chowdhury","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 7, S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,9,5]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"380","DOI":"10.2307\/3003562","article-title":"Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications","volume":"12","author":"Milgrom","year":"1981","journal-title":"Bell J. Econ."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"461","DOI":"10.1086\/466995","article-title":"The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality","volume":"24","author":"Grossman","year":"1981","journal-title":"J. Law Econ."},{"key":"ref_3","unstructured":"Schelling, T.C. (1980). The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press."},{"key":"ref_4","first-page":"234","article-title":"Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Failure","volume":"80","author":"Battalio","year":"1990","journal-title":"Am. Econ. 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