{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,21]],"date-time":"2026-03-21T05:52:04Z","timestamp":1774072324108,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":38,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,9,30]],"date-time":"2018-09-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1538265600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"name":"IMC Seed Funding, Interacting Minds Centre at Aarhus University","award":["2017-143"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["2017-143"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and for sustaining the provision of public goods. We study the decision whether to engage in costly punishment of a free rider in a survey-based experiment with 1423 students from seven study areas in the social sciences, as well as medicine at Aarhus University, Denmark. Using a dictator game and a social dilemma game, that captures essential features of the public goods game, we replicate previous findings that economics students give significantly less than students from other disciplines. However, when subjects decide whether or not to punish a free rider, we find that economics students are just as likely to punish as students from other disciplines.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g9040075","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,2]],"date-time":"2018-10-02T08:23:50Z","timestamp":1538468630000},"page":"75","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Do Economists Punish Less?"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"9","author":[{"given":"Jonas Pilgaard","family":"Kaiser","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Aarhus V 8210, Denmark"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Kasper Selmar","family":"Pedersen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Aarhus V 8210, Denmark"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9471-1636","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Alexander K.","family":"Koch","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Aarhus V 8210, Denmark"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,9,30]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"387","DOI":"10.2307\/1925895","article-title":"The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure","volume":"36","author":"Samuelson","year":"1954","journal-title":"Rev. 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