{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,3]],"date-time":"2026-04-03T20:00:58Z","timestamp":1775246458687,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":19,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,9]],"date-time":"2018-10-09T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1539043200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced sellers was consistent with benchmark theory: average reserve price for these sellers was independent of the number of bidders and equaled the predicted level. Less experienced sellers however deviated from the theoretical benchmark: on average, they tended to shade reserve price below the predicted level and positively relate it to the number of bidders.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g9040079","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,9]],"date-time":"2018-10-09T11:10:44Z","timestamp":1539083444000},"page":"79","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Learning to Set the Reserve Price Optimally in Laboratory First Price Auctions"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"9","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-8650-0414","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Priyodorshi","family":"Banerjee","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Baranagar, Kolkata, West Bengal 700108, India"}]},{"given":"Shashwat","family":"Khare","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, 6211 LK Maastricht, The Netherlands"}]},{"given":"P.","family":"Srikant","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Madras School of Economics, Chennai, Tamil Nadu 600025, India"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,10,9]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","unstructured":"Krishna, V. 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