{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,6,3]],"date-time":"2026-06-03T11:50:38Z","timestamp":1780487438627,"version":"3.54.1"},"reference-count":50,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"4","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,11,2]],"date-time":"2018-11-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1541116800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"<jats:p>In this work, we explore the role of learning dynamics and social norms in human cooperation on networks. We study the model recently introduced in [Physical Review E, 97, 042321 (2018)] that integrates the well-studied Experience Weighted Attraction learning model with some features characterizing human norm psychology, namely the set of cognitive abilities humans have evolved to deal with social norms. We provide further evidence that this extended model\u2014that we refer to as Experience Weighted Attraction with Norm Psychology\u2014closely reproduces cooperative patterns of behavior observed in large-scale experiments with humans. In particular, we provide additional support for the finding that, when deciding to cooperate, humans balance between the choice that returns higher payoffs with the choice in agreement with social norms. In our experiment, agents play a prisoner\u2019s dilemma game on various network structures: (i) a static lattice where agents have a fixed position; (ii) a regular random network where agents have a fixed position; and (iii) a dynamic lattice where agents are randomly re-positioned at each game iteration. Our results show that the network structure does not affect the dynamics of cooperation, which corroborates results of prior laboratory experiments. However, the network structure does seem to affect how individuals balance between their self-interested and normative choices.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g9040090","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,11,5]],"date-time":"2018-11-05T04:26:39Z","timestamp":1541391999000},"page":"90","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":7,"title":["Learning Dynamics and Norm Psychology Supports Human Cooperation in a Large-Scale Prisoner\u2019s Dilemma on Networks"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"9","author":[{"given":"John","family":"Realpe-G\u00f3mez","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Instituto de Matem\u00e1ticas Aplicadas, Universidad de Cartagena, 130001 Bol\u00edvar, Colombia"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-3485-9249","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Daniele","family":"Vilone","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"LABSS (Laboratory of Agent Based Social Simulation), Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology, National Research Council (CNR), 00185 Rome, Italy"},{"name":"Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos, Departamento de Matem\u00e1ticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Legan\u00e9s, Madrid, Spain"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Giulia","family":"Andrighetto","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"LABSS (Laboratory of Agent Based Social Simulation), Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology, National Research Council (CNR), 00185 Rome, Italy"},{"name":"School of Education, Culture and Communication, M\u00e4lardalens University, 722 20 Vasteras, Sweden"},{"name":"Institute for Futures Studies, 101 31 Stockholm, Sweden"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Luis G.","family":"Nardin","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Informatics, Brandenburg University of Technology, 03046 Cottbus, Germany"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Javier A.","family":"Montoya","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Instituto de Matem\u00e1ticas Aplicadas, Universidad de Cartagena, 130001 Bol\u00edvar, Colombia"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,11,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","unstructured":"Smith, J.M., and Szathm\u00e1ry, E. 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