{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,6,7]],"date-time":"2026-06-07T22:09:35Z","timestamp":1780870175174,"version":"3.54.1"},"reference-count":25,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,1,16]],"date-time":"2020-01-16T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1579132800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Information"],"abstract":"<jats:p>In this paper the Buechner\u2013Tavani model of digital trust is revised\u2014new conditions for self-trust are incorporated into the model. These new conditions raise several philosophical problems concerning the idea of a substantial self for social robotics, which are closely examined. I conclude that reductionism about the self is incompatible with, while the idea of a substantial self is compatible with, trust relations between human agents, between human agents and artificial agents, and between artificial agents.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/info11010048","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,1,17]],"date-time":"2020-01-17T07:39:02Z","timestamp":1579246742000},"page":"48","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["A Revision of the Buechner\u2013Tavani Model of Digital Trust and a Philosophical Problem It Raises for Social Robotics"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"11","author":[{"given":"Jeff","family":"Buechner","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University-Newark, Newark, NJ 07103, USA"},{"name":"The Saul Kripke Center, CUNY, The Graduate Center, New York, NY 10016, USA"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,1,16]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"39","DOI":"10.1007\/s10676-010-9249-z","article-title":"Trust and multi-agent systems: Applying the \u201cdiffuse, default model\u201d of trust to experiments involving artificial agents","volume":"13","author":"Buechner","year":"2011","journal-title":"Ethics Inf. 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