{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,10]],"date-time":"2026-02-10T06:38:11Z","timestamp":1770705491215,"version":"3.49.0"},"reference-count":28,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"10","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,10,12]],"date-time":"2020-10-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1602460800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100012325","name":"National Social Science Fund","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["17BGL156"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["17BGL156"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100012325","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Symmetry"],"abstract":"<jats:p>In construction projects, improper quality behavior of a participant results in quality behavior risks, which can transmit to the downstream participants and may cause detrimental effects on the quality of the entity finally constructed. Controlling the transmission of quality behavior risks is the key to effectively supervising and ensuring the quality of construction projects. In this study, the effectiveness of the quality supervision system of construction projects in China was investigated by considering the transmission of quality behavior risks. A multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of the players of quality supervision of a government department, upstream participant (UP), and downstream participant (DP) was generated. By using the system dynamics theory, the game model was simulated to determine the stability of the evolutionary system and to evaluate the effectiveness of China\u2019s current quality supervision system under different scenarios. The results showed that there is no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the evolutionary system of the current quality supervision system in China and there are fluctuations in the evolution process. It revealed that high risk exists in the current quality supervision system in China. To resolve the problem of the low efficiency of the current Chinese supervision system, a dynamic penalty and incentive method is developed, which has been proven to be able to effectively control the quality behavior risks in construction projects and hence ensuring the quality of the entity finally constructed.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/sym12101660","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,10,17]],"date-time":"2020-10-17T07:23:22Z","timestamp":1602919402000},"page":"1660","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":12,"title":["Evaluation of the Quality Supervision System for Construction Projects in China Considering the Quality Behavior Risk Transmission"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"12","author":[{"given":"Jingchun","family":"Feng","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Project Management, Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China"},{"name":"Jiangsu Provincial Collaborative Innovation Center of World Water Valley and Water Ecological Civilization, Nanjing 211100, China"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-7020-6950","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Yuting","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Project Management, Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China"}]},{"given":"Ke","family":"Zhang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Project Management, Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China"},{"name":"Jiangsu Provincial Collaborative Innovation Center of World Water Valley and Water Ecological Civilization, Nanjing 211100, China"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,10,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"899","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jclepro.2018.12.226","article-title":"Perceptions towards risks involved in off-site construction in the integrated design & construction project delivery","volume":"213","author":"Wu","year":"2019","journal-title":"J. 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