{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,11]],"date-time":"2025-10-11T02:57:23Z","timestamp":1760151443631,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":24,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,8]],"date-time":"2022-03-08T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1646697600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Symmetry"],"abstract":"<jats:p>The aim of the paper is to examine the notion of simple Kantian equilibrium in 2\u00d72 symmetric games and their quantum counterparts. We focus on finding the Kantian equilibrium strategies in the general form of the games. As a result, we derive a formula that determines the reasonable strategies for any payoffs in the bimatrix game. This allowed us to compare the payoff results for classical and quantum way of playing the game. We showed that a very large part of 2\u00d72 symmetric games, in which the arithmetic mean of the off-diagonal payoffs is greater than the other payoffs, have more beneficial Kantian equilibria when they are played with the use of quantum strategies. In that case, both players always obtain higher payoffs than when they use the classical strategies.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/sym14030546","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,9]],"date-time":"2022-03-09T01:50:53Z","timestamp":1646790653000},"page":"546","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Kantian Equilibria in Classical and Quantum Symmetric Games"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"14","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-0034-9803","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Piotr","family":"Fr\u0105ckiewicz","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Exact and Technical Sciences, Pomeranian University in S\u0142upsk, ul. Arciszewskiego 22d, 76-200 S\u0142upsk, Poland"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,8]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"295","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01448847","article-title":"Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele","volume":"100","year":"1928","journal-title":"Math. Ann."},{"key":"ref_2","unstructured":"Von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press."},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"48","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.36.1.48","article-title":"Equilibrium points in n-person games","volume":"36","author":"Nash","year":"1950","journal-title":"Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA"},{"key":"ref_4","unstructured":"Myerson, R.B. (1997). 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