{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,10]],"date-time":"2025-10-10T01:46:28Z","timestamp":1760060788306,"version":"build-2065373602"},"reference-count":35,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"9","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,18]],"date-time":"2025-09-18T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1758153600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001809","name":"NSFC","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["71771031"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["71771031"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001809","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Systems"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Effective control of collusive behavior in the government bidding process is a prerequisite for promoting the high-quality development of social economy, consolidating the results of the anti-corruption struggle and the smooth operation of the project. Based on risk theory and Bayesian networks, this paper uses GeNIE 4.0 software to construct a Bayesian network structure model to analyze the causal chain of vertical collusion in government project tendering processes. The study found three key causal chain paths: \u2460 external supervision subject to collusion gains, external environment, competitive pressure, and lack of compliance awareness of the formation of \u201cexternal supervision subject \u2192 response subject \u2192 vertical collusion\u201d regulatory failure of vertical collusion path; \u2461 rights subject to collusion gains, the external environment, and the lack of publicity of policies and regulations. External supervision is influenced by collusion gains, the external environment, competitive pressure, and compliance awareness of the formation of the \u201crights subject \u2192 external supervision subject \u2192 response subject \u2192 vertical collusion\u201d internal and external collusion path; the rights of the subject, affected by the collusion gains, the external environment, and the lack of publicity of policies and regulations, form a collusion path of uncontrolled rights. It is also found that, at the subject level, the subject of rights and the subject of external supervision are in a key position in the control process; at the factor level, the control of collusion proceeds, the publicity of policies and regulations, and the external environment can significantly enhance the control effect of vertical collusion and provide a precise focus for the collusion chain to break the chain.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/systems13090821","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,18]],"date-time":"2025-09-18T14:45:46Z","timestamp":1758206746000},"page":"821","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Research on the Causal Chain of Vertical Collusion in Bidding for Government Investment Projects"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"13","author":[{"given":"Dai","family":"Yao","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Hunan Provincial Public Resources Trading Centre, Changsha 410000, China"},{"name":"School of Transportation, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha 410114, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Yun","family":"Chen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Transportation, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha 410114, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9990-2300","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Chongsen","family":"Ma","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"College of Water Conservancy & Architectural Engineering, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,18]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Dong, G., and Zhong, D. 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