{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,22]],"date-time":"2026-07-22T05:02:34Z","timestamp":1784696554272,"version":"3.55.0"},"reference-count":28,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"14","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,17]],"date-time":"2026-07-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1784246400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Sensors"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are essential for navigation in aviation, transportation, and autonomous systems, yet they remain vulnerable to intentional interference such as jamming and spoofing. Unlike prior studies that primarily focus on positioning error, this work emphasizes acquisition-phase behavior, analyzing the impact of interference on time-to-first-fix (TTFF) and post-attack reacquisition time. A controlled and repeatable laboratory testbed based on software-defined radio (SDR) was developed to emulate Global Positioning System (GPS) L1 and Galileo E1 signals under multiple interference scenarios, including narrowband jamming, static spoofing, and dynamic spoofing. Five commercial GNSS receivers were evaluated under identical conditions. The results show that jamming causes an immediate loss of positioning capability, reducing the empirical navigation-fix probability to near zero and significantly increasing reacquisition time, with recovery-phase empirical fix probabilities ranging from 0.062 to 0.991 depending on receiver class. In contrast, spoofing maintains high attack-phase empirical navigation-fix probabilities ranging from 0.730 to 0.907 while introducing persistent and undetected errors. Static position spoofing was found to produce position offsets that persisted into the recovery phase, delaying the return to the authentic navigation solution. For most receivers, however, correct positioning was restored within the observation window. Multi-constellation spoofing further increases attack effectiveness, raising fix continuity by more than 0.15 compared to single-constellation cases. Multi-band receivers demonstrate increased resilience by delaying spoof acceptance by more than 4 min in extended scenarios, rather than preventing it entirely. The proposed methodology enables reproducible evaluation of GNSS receiver robustness and demonstrates that navigation-fix continuity alone is not a reliable indicator of navigation integrity during spoofing attacks. Overall, the results demonstrate that navigation-fix continuity alone cannot be regarded as a reliable indicator of navigation integrity and highlight the importance of complementary integrity-monitoring mechanisms for GNSS-dependent systems. The reported observations were obtained under controlled laboratory conditions and should be interpreted within the context of the adopted experimental methodology rather than as a direct representation of operational performance in real-world environments.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/s26144551","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,20]],"date-time":"2026-07-20T06:09:09Z","timestamp":1784527749000},"page":"4551","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/mdpi_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Experimental Evaluation of GNSS Receiver Vulnerability to Spoofing and Jamming Using SDR-Based Testbed"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"26","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-1402-4914","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jan","family":"Du\u0142owicz","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Cyber Defense Forces Component Command, 05-119 Legionowo, Poland"},{"name":"Institute of Communications Systems, Faculty of Electronics, Military University of Technology, 00-908 Warsaw, Poland"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8658-4518","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Pawe\u0142","family":"Skokowski","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Communications Systems, Faculty of Electronics, Military University of Technology, 00-908 Warsaw, Poland"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-3902-0784","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jan M.","family":"Kelner","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Communications Systems, Faculty of Electronics, Military University of Technology, 00-908 Warsaw, Poland"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,17]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2768","DOI":"10.1109\/TIM.2018.2869261","article-title":"Software-Defined Radio GNSS Instrumentation for Spoofing Mitigation: A Review and a Case Study","volume":"68","author":"Schmidt","year":"2019","journal-title":"IEEE Trans. Instrum. Meas."},{"key":"ref_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"165444","DOI":"10.1109\/ACCESS.2020.3022294","article-title":"Spoofing and Anti-Spoofing Technologies of Global Navigation Satellite System: A Survey","volume":"8","author":"Wu","year":"2020","journal-title":"IEEE Access"},{"key":"ref_3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"617","DOI":"10.1002\/rob.21513","article-title":"Unmanned Aircraft Capture and Control via GPS Spoofing","volume":"31","author":"Kerns","year":"2014","journal-title":"J. Field Robot."},{"key":"ref_4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1258","DOI":"10.1109\/JPROC.2016.2526658","article-title":"GNSS Spoofing and Detection","volume":"104","author":"Psiaki","year":"2016","journal-title":"Proc. IEEE"},{"key":"ref_5","first-page":"127072","article-title":"GPS Vulnerability to Spoofing Threats and a Review of Antispoofing Techniques","volume":"2012","author":"Broumandan","year":"2012","journal-title":"Int. J. Navig. Obs."},{"key":"ref_6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Meng, L., Yang, L., Yang, W., and Zhang, L. (2022). A Survey of GNSS Spoofing and Anti-Spoofing Technology. Remote Sens., 14.","DOI":"10.3390\/rs14194826"},{"key":"ref_7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"836","DOI":"10.1109\/TAES.2015.140297","article-title":"Antispoofing RAIM for Dual-Recursion Particle Filter of GNSS Calculation","volume":"52","author":"Han","year":"2016","journal-title":"IEEE Trans. Aerosp. Electron. Syst."},{"key":"ref_8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Zhang, C., Shui, L., Huang, H., Chen, Q., Liu, H., Jiao, H., and Feng, L. (2016). Research on the Mechanism and the Impact of Jamming on Beidou Software Receiver. Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE Chinese Guidance, Navigation and Control Conference (CGNCC), IEEE.","DOI":"10.1109\/CGNCC.2016.7828783"},{"key":"ref_9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"153960","DOI":"10.1109\/ACCESS.2020.2973759","article-title":"GNSS Vulnerabilities and Existing Solutions: A Review of the Literature","volume":"9","author":"Zidan","year":"2021","journal-title":"IEEE Access"},{"key":"ref_10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"177","DOI":"10.1002\/navi.14","article-title":"Practical Cryptographic Civil GPS Signal Authentication","volume":"59","author":"Wesson","year":"2012","journal-title":"NAVIGATION"},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"42635","DOI":"10.1109\/ACCESS.2021.3065926","article-title":"Survey on Anti-Drone Systems: Components, Designs, and Challenges","volume":"9","author":"Park","year":"2021","journal-title":"IEEE Access"},{"key":"ref_12","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"139","DOI":"10.55676\/asi.v4i2.64","article-title":"Testing GNSS Receiver Robustness for Jamming","volume":"4","author":"Kryk","year":"2023","journal-title":"Aviat. Secur. Issues"},{"key":"ref_13","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"109","DOI":"10.1007\/s11370-022-00452-4","article-title":"Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Practical Aspects, Applications, Open Challenges, Security Issues, and Future Trends","volume":"16","author":"Mohsan","year":"2023","journal-title":"Intell. Serv. Robot."},{"key":"ref_14","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Brito, A., Sebasti\u00e3o, P., and Souto, N. (2019). Jamming for Unauthorized UAV Operations-Communications Link. Proceedings of the 2019 International Young Engineers Forum (YEF-ECE), IEEE.","DOI":"10.1109\/YEF-ECE.2019.8740828"},{"key":"ref_15","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"11443","DOI":"10.1109\/ACCESS.2021.3138048","article-title":"A Survey on Spectrum Management for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)","volume":"10","author":"Jasim","year":"2022","journal-title":"IEEE Access"},{"key":"ref_16","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"012044","DOI":"10.1088\/1742-6596\/1738\/1\/012044","article-title":"Drone Presence Detection by the Drone\u2019s RF Communication","volume":"1738","author":"Lv","year":"2021","journal-title":"J. Phys. Conf. Ser."},{"key":"ref_17","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"102324","DOI":"10.1016\/j.adhoc.2020.102324","article-title":"A Comprehensive Review of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks and Neutralization Techniques","volume":"111","author":"Chamola","year":"2021","journal-title":"Ad Hoc Netw."},{"key":"ref_18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"\u0160imon, O., and G\u00f6tthans, T. (2022). A Survey on the Use of Deep Learning Techniques for UAV Jamming and Deception. Electronics, 11.","DOI":"10.3390\/electronics11193025"},{"key":"ref_19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"\u0160imon, O., G\u00f6tthans, T., and Popela, M. (2022). Commercial UAV Jamming Possibilities. Proceedings of the 2022 32nd International Conference Radioelektronika (RADIOELEKTRONIKA), IEEE.","DOI":"10.1109\/RADIOELEKTRONIKA54537.2022.9764904"},{"key":"ref_20","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"P\u00e4rlin, K., Alam, M.M., and Le Moullec, Y. (2018). Jamming of UAV Remote Control Systems Using Software Defined Radio. Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems (ICMCIS), IEEE.","DOI":"10.1109\/ICMCIS.2018.8398711"},{"key":"ref_21","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Di Pietro, R., Oligeri, G., and Tedeschi, P. (2019). JAM-ME: Exploiting Jamming to Accomplish Drone Mission. Proceedings of the 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), IEEE.","DOI":"10.1109\/CNS.2019.8802717"},{"key":"ref_22","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"701","DOI":"10.1017\/S0373463313000271","article-title":"Development of a PC-Based Software Receiver for the Reception of Beidou Navigation Satellite Signals","volume":"66","author":"Juang","year":"2013","journal-title":"J. Navig."},{"key":"ref_23","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Haluza, M., and \u010cech\u00e1k, J. (2016). Analysis and Decoding of Radio Signals for Remote Control of Drones. Proceedings of the 2016 New Trends in Signal Processing (NTSP), IEEE.","DOI":"10.1109\/NTSP.2016.7747781"},{"key":"ref_24","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"9","DOI":"10.1186\/s41445-018-0018-3","article-title":"Development of a GPS Spoofing Apparatus to Attack a DJI Matrice 100 Quadcopter","volume":"16","author":"Horton","year":"2018","journal-title":"J. Glob. Position. Syst."},{"key":"ref_25","first-page":"931","article-title":"Survey on Intentional Interference Techniques of GNSS Signals and Radio Links between Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and Ground Control Station","volume":"19","author":"Skokowski","year":"2025","journal-title":"TransNav Int. J. Mar. Navig. Saf. Sea Transp."},{"key":"ref_26","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Du\u0142owicz, J., Skokowski, P., and Kelner, J.M. (2025). Energy-Efficient Jammers for GNSS Signals. Proceedings of the 2025 Signal Processing Symposium (SPSympo), IEEE.","DOI":"10.23919\/SPSympo63739.2025.11124092"},{"key":"ref_27","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Margana, B.S., Achanta, D.S., Songala, K.K., and Ammana, S.R. (2021). A Simple SDR Based Method to Spoof Low-End GPS Aided Drones for Securing Locations. Proceedings of the 2021 IEEE International Conference on Robotics, Automation, Artificial-Intelligence and Internet-of-Things (RAAICON), IEEE.","DOI":"10.1109\/RAAICON54709.2021.9929965"},{"key":"ref_28","unstructured":"Humphreys, T.E., Ledvina, B.M., Psiaki, M.L., O\u2019Hanlon, B.W., and Kintner, P.M. (2008). Assessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a Portable GPS Civilian Spoofer. Proceedings of the 2008 21st International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS), Institute of Navigation."}],"container-title":["Sensors"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/1424-8220\/26\/14\/4551\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,22]],"date-time":"2026-07-22T04:14:33Z","timestamp":1784693673000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/1424-8220\/26\/14\/4551"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,17]]},"references-count":28,"journal-issue":{"issue":"14","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,7]]}},"alternative-id":["s26144551"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/s26144551","relation":{},"ISSN":["1424-8220"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1424-8220","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,17]]}}}