{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,19]],"date-time":"2025-05-19T10:40:07Z","timestamp":1747651207255,"version":"3.40.5"},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"University of Bor\u00e5s","issue":"CoLIS","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,19]],"date-time":"2025-05-19T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1747612800000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc\/4.0"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["IR"],"abstract":"<jats:p>Introduction. Hannah Arendt argues that, in the twentieth century, there arose diffuse systems of mendacity tied to information communication. Such \u2018modern lies\u2019 engendered self-deception among both officials and citizens, allowing the perpetuation of atrocities. In this paper, I examine self-deception from within philosophy of information, confronting and deconstructing a central dichotomy in self-deception research: that between ontological and psychological renderings of the concept.\r\nMethod. Derridean deconstruction is used to create and mine tension between ontological and psychological self-deception. Ultimately, informational self-deception is reconstructed within this tension.\r\nAnalysis. Ontological self-deception positions deceit as a natural and passive condition of being-in-the-world. As members of an entropic infosphere, we are all subject to self-deception, and we thus have an imperative to continually question ourselves and our information. Psychological self-deception positions such deceit as an active concept; rather than the passive condition of the many, self-deception is the active choice of a few. This opens questions surrounding intentionality, motivation and variances in levels of deceit.\r\nConclusions. Ultimately, I reconstruct informational self-deception as sustained by the tensions between ontological and psychological self-deception, raising new questions for philosophy of information regarding what it means to be deceived.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.47989\/ir30colis52312","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,19]],"date-time":"2025-05-19T10:09:29Z","timestamp":1747649369000},"page":"278-290","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Informational self-deception: deconstruction and reconstruction within philosophy of information"],"prefix":"10.47989","volume":"30","author":[{"given":"Juliana","family":"Mestre","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"27919","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,19]]},"container-title":["Information Research an international electronic journal"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/publicera.kb.se\/ir\/article\/download\/52312\/43391","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/publicera.kb.se\/ir\/article\/download\/52312\/43391","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,19]],"date-time":"2025-05-19T10:09:29Z","timestamp":1747649369000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/publicera.kb.se\/ir\/article\/view\/52312"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,19]]},"references-count":0,"journal-issue":{"issue":"CoLIS","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,19]]}},"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.47989\/ir30colis52312","relation":{},"ISSN":["1368-1613"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1368-1613","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2025,5,19]]}}}