none 10.5325/philrhet.57.3.0276 The Pennsylvania State University Press The Pennsylvania State University Press 3287 168636136 46318 2024121017374865700 10.5325 2026-06-05T10:35:11Z 2024-12-10T12:38:54Z 4 Philosophy & Rhetoric 0031-8213 1527-2079 12 2024 12 02 2024 57 3 John Casey Philosophy Program, Northeastern Illinois University http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7665-763X ABSTRACT Autonomy is foundational to ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of mind, and it has been closely associated with argumentation. What is curious about autonomy is that it has traditionally been explained in terms of reasoning and argument: autonomy involves reasoning because, standardly, someone who’s autonomous is one who thinks things through, who has reasons for their actions. Autonomy regards argument because to respect the autonomy of someone who thinks things through, one must offer them reasons, that is, argue with them. One common thought is that provided one’s arguments meet certain criteria (e.g., they’re not sophistries or clever manipulations), then argument respects autonomy. But is this really so? 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